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Republicanism with the Position of Superpresident 
Differentiation of Presidential and Semi-
Presidential Systems  
of Government with Superpresidents 
 
VITALIY S. LYTVYN 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Today, in Political Science, there are two major methodological approaches 
of understanding political (or constitutional) systems of government, i.e. 
dichotomous and trichotomous approaches. The dichotomous approach takes 
into consideration such two classical systems of republican and monarchical 
forms of government as presidentialism and parliamentarism. According to the 
trichotomous approach, the scientific analysis is supplemented with such a 
republican system of government as semi-presidentialism1. Considering this, we 
must understand that Political Science tends to use the term “system of 
government”, not the term “form of government”. Such clarification is quite 
relevant because the form of government can be estimated and based on a 
method of formation or replacement of the head of state (without taking into 
account the responsibilities of the head of state). Instead, the system of 
government is based on formal (constitutional) or actual (political) prerequisites 
of interinstitutional relations concerning state power (without considering 
powers of the head of state). Forms of government are distinguished as republic, 
monarchy and combination or variation of republic and monarchy, because the 
head of state can be elected or obtain his/her seat, according to the hereditary 
principle. On the contrary, among different systems of government it is required 
to distinguish presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary types, which are 
different from monarchical and republican forms of government. It is clear that 
presidential and semi-presidential systems of government (presidentialism and 
semi-presidentialism) are the examples of the republican form of government, 
and parliamentary system of government is a type of republican or monarchical 
forms of government. 
                                                        
1
  Very often in relation to the category of “semi-presidentialism”, the concept/definition of 
“mixed republicanism” is used. We believe it is a methodological misunderstanding because 
mixing can be possible only within classical presidentialism and classical parliamentarism 
without taking into account semi-presidentialism. 
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We can discovery this particular (dichotomous or trichotomous) 
methodological structuring of forms and systems of government in the scientific 
reflections of Verney2, von Beyme3, Steffani4, Duverger5, Riggs6, Shugart and 
Carey7, Stepan and Skach8, Linz9, Sartori10, Mainwaring and Shugart11, 
Lijphart12, Siaroff13, Daly14, Strøm15, Elgie16 and others. However, being the 
supporters of the trichotomous logical model and approach, we follow Elgie’s 
definitions of constitutional systems within republican form of government, but with 
some our personal changes and clarifications17. This means that we take the 
                                                        
2
  Douglas Verney, The Analysis of Political Systems, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1959; 
Idem, The Analysis of Political Systems, Routledge, London, 2013. 
3
  Klaus von Beyme, Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa, Piper, Munich, 
1970. 
4
  Winfried Steffani, Parlamentarische und präsidielle Demokratie, Westdeutscher Verlag, 
1979. 
5
  Maurice Duverger, “A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government”, 
European Journal of Political Research, vol. 8, no. 2, 1980, pp. 165-187. 
6
  Fred Riggs, “The Survival of Presidentialism in America: Para-constitutional Practices”, 
International Political Science Review, vol. 8, no. 4, 1988, pp. 247-278. 
7
  Matthew Shugart, John Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1992. 
8
  Alfred Stepan, Skach Cindy, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: 
Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism”, World Politics, vol. 46, no. 1, 1993, pp. 1-22. 
9
  Juan Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make а Difference”, in 
Arturo Valenzuela, Juan Linz (eds.), The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative 
Perspectives, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 3-87. 
10
  Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: an Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, 
and Outcomes, Houndmills, 1997. 
11
  Scott Mainwaring, Matthew Shugart, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997. 
12
  Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries, Yale University Press, 1999; Idem, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies”, 
Journal of Democracy, vol. 15, no. 2, 2004, pp. 96-109. 
13
  Alan Siaroff, “Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-
Presidential and Parliamentary Distinction”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 42, 
no. 3, 2003, pp. 287-312; Idem, “Varieties of Parliamentarism in the Advanced Industrial 
Democracies”, International Political Science Review, vol. 24, no. 4, 2003, pp. 445-464. 
14
  Siobhan Daly, “The Ladder of Abstraction: A Framework for the Systematic Classification 
of Democratic Regime Types”, Politics, vol. 23, no. 2, 2003, pp. 96-108. 
15
  Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang Müller, Torbjörn Bergman, Delegation and Accountability in 
Parliamentary Democracies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003. 
16
  Robert Elgie, Semi-Presidentialism in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999; Idem, 
“The Classification of Democratic Regime Type: Conceptual Ambiguity and Contestable 
Assumptions”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 33, no. 2, 1998, pp. 219-238; 
Idem, “From Linz to Tsebelis: Three Waves of Presidential/Parliamentary Studies?”, 
Democratization, vol. 12, no. 1, 2005, pp. 106-122; Idem, “Variations on a Theme: A Fresh 
Look at Semi-Presidentialism”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, no. 3, 2005, pp. 1-21. 
17
  Vitaliy Lytvyn, “Do problemy rozriznennya napivprezydentalizmu ta parlamentaryzmu: 
napivprezydent·s'ki systemy z nominal'nymy prezydentamy u Tsentral'niy Yevropi (na 
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definitions of constitutional systems proposed by Elgie as a basis, but slightly expand 
and refine them. As a result, we get three definitions of constitutional systems: 
Presidentialism is a constitutional system of republican form of 
government, which inherits the position of a popularly (directly or indirectly) 
elected for a fixed term president (head of state) and cabinet or administration 
of a president (possibly even of a prime minister). The members of the cabinet 
or presidential administration are collectively responsible only to the president. 
Simultaneously members of the cabinet or presidential administration can be 
also individually responsible (reporting or responsible for) to the Parliament or 
to the leading house of Parliament, but it has no definitive meaning.  
Parliamentarism is a constitutional system of republican form of 
government, where the president obtains the position after indirect elections (for 
example, in Parliament). The prime minister and the cabinet are collectively 
responsible only to the Parliament. The members of the cabinet, except the 
prime minister, may also be individually responsible to the president and 
Parliament or the leading house of Parliament, but it has no definitive meaning.  
Semi-presidentialism is a constitutional system of republican form of 
government, which preserves the position of a popularly (directly or indirectly) 
elected for a fixed term president (head of state). The prime minister and the 
cabinet are obligatorily and collectively responsible to the Parliament. 
Simultaneously the prime minister and the cabinet can be collectively responsible 
to the Parliament and to the president. Moreover, members of the cabinet can be 
individually responsible to the Parliament and/or to the president, but it has no 
definitive meaning. 
The above-proposed definitions of presidentialism, parliamentarism and 
semi-presidentialism are initially proposed by Elgie18, but somewhat clarified and 
expanded. It is interesting that Elgie’s approach does not include formal and/or 
actual powers of presidents19. This, for example, is different from the idea of 
Duverger, under which semi-presidentialism should be characterized with 
“president’s quite considerable powers”20. Similarly, a presidential republic 
                                                                                                                                       
prykladi Bolhariyi, Slovachchyny, Sloveniyi ta Chekhiyi)”, in Zbigniew Bialoblockiy, 
Anatoliy Romanyuk (eds.), Rozwój polityczny i spoleczny państw Europy Środkowej i 
Wschodniej, Kutno, 2013, pp. 149-171. 
18
  Robert Elgie, “The Classification of Democratic Regime Type:…cit.”; Idem, Semi-
Presidentialism in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999; Idem, “Variations on a 
Theme:…cit.”.  
19
  It is an advantage of the approach to the classification of constitutional systems, which are 
based on the statement that it is not necessary to reference on relational peculiarities of 
political process. In such way, there is implemented a mechanism of avoiding subjectivity in 
classification. See detailed: Robert Elgie, “The Classification of Democratic Regime 
Type:…cit.”; Vitaliy Lytvyn, “Podviyna Vykonavcha Vlada: Teoriya ta Praktyka Yevropeys’koho 
Pivprezydentalizmu”, Osvita Rehionu: Politolohiya, Psyholohiya, Komunikaciyi, vol. 3, 2009, 
pp. 25-33. 
20
  Maurice Duverger, “A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government”, 
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should be drawn with a post of very strong president and a parliamentary republic 
with a post of very weak president. However, the real point is that presidential 
powers can vary depending not only on the constitutional but also on political, 
historical or psychological conditions. For example, presidential powers depend on 
the results of presidential and parliamentary elections, historical peculiarities of 
presidential responsibilities, the socioeconomic characteristics of the country, 
personal qualities of the president etc. As a result, the variation of presidential 
powers, which can be measured, based on both qualitative and quantitative 
indicators/markers, may affect actual positioning of certain constitutional 
systems of government.  
As a result, presidentialisation or parliamentarisation (i.e. 
personalisation) of different (presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential) 
constitutional systems of government are possible. Some countries, while 
remaining constitutionally unchanged, may operate in practice, as evidenced by 
results of qualitative and quantitative comparison of actual presidential powers in 
different cases, as more presidential systems (such as Russia, Belarus, 
Azerbaijan, etc.), more parliamentary systems (such as Slovenia, Ireland, Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, etc.) or balanced systems (such as Poland, Lithuania, 
Romania, etc.). Therefore, it is clear that different constitutional systems of 
government can be divergent in concern of formal/actual presidential powers. 
Hereupon, presidentialism, parliamentarism and especially semi-presidentialism can 
have the position of a very weak (ceremonial or nominal), weak, intermediate 
(balanced), strong or very strong (powerful or super) president. For example, 
among semi-presidential systems of government (semi-presidentialism as defined 
by Elgie21) as of 2015, nominal presidents were in Ireland, Slovenia, etc., weak 
presidents were in Finland, Montenegro, etc., intermediate/balanced presidents were 
in Romania, Lithuania, Portugal, etc., strong presidents were in Ukraine, Georgia, 
Armenia, etc., and superpresidents were in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan etc. 
However, even such theoretical and methodological differentiation of 
presidential powers in different constitutional systems of government quite 
widely shows that the understanding of political systems in political and 
academic discourse is vague and brings different requirements for separation 
semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism or semi-presidentialism and 
presidentialism. The misunderstanding is usually caused by the literal transfer of 
positions of very weak presidents (without taking into account the type of 
presidential elections) into parliamentary systems of government or positions of 
very strong presidents (also without taking into account the type of presidential 
elections) into presidential systems of government. At the same time, formal 
assessments of presidential, parliamentary or semi-presidential systems of 
                                                                                                                                       
European Journal of Political Research, vol. 8, no. 2, 1980, pp. 165-187. 
21
  Robert Elgie, “The Classification of Democratic Regime Type:…cit.”. 
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government often remain out of site. Therefore, it is clear that the key analytical 
point of extrapolation should match the formal and actual powers of such 
institutions as president, prime minister (cabinet in general) and Parliament. This 
creates the possibility of comparative analysis of different constitutional systems 
of government based on the consideration of different political actors’ powers. 
In our study, it generates the demand of comparative analysis of the republics 
with the positions of superpresident, which, as noted above, can be theoretically 
peculiar to different constitutional systems of government, but above all for 
presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. Accordingly, our research is devoted 
to outlining the phenomenon and varieties of republics with superpresidents. The 
study is methodologically based on the related categories of constitutional 
system of government (especially in Elgie’s reasoning with some our 
clarifications and explanations) and powers of presidents (using different 
indicators and markers, which had been previously singled out by different 
scientists). The study is comparatively and descriptively oriented and had been 
enforced within neo-institutional methodology. 
 
 
Superpresidents and Republics with Superpresidents:  
The State of Literature 
 
While shifting specified feature to republican constitutional systems of 
government, we understand that in some of them there is, for example, a 
significant correlation of popularly elected presidents’ powers. The problem goes 
deeper when powers of popularly elected presidents are very significant. Therefore, 
when republican systems of government have very powerful presidents, they are 
sometimes called “republics with superpresidents”. Some scholars connect such 
republican systems of government only with presidential systems and others 
scholars with both presidential and semi-presidential systems. In dichotomous 
approaches of understanding political (constitutional) systems of government, the 
highlighted systems appear to be the cases of presidentialism. Instead, the taxonomy 
of the position of superpresident in trichotomous classifications of modern 
republicanism remains unresolved. The fact is that some scientists distinguish such 
republican systems of government as superpresidentialism (or superpresidential 
presidentialism) and others as super semi-presidentialism (or superpresidential semi-
presidentialism). The synthesising attributes of specified taxonomies are very 
considerable powers of presidents, which, according to Holmes22, Ishiyama, 
Kennedy23 and Fish24, are the reason for classification the following systems of 
                                                        
22
  Stephen Holmes, “Superpresidentialism and Its Problems”, East European Constitutional 
Review, vol. 2, no. 4, 1993, pp. 123-126. 
23
  John T. Ishiyama, Ryan Kennedy, “Superpresidentialism and Political Party Development 
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government as “republics with superpresidents”.  
Largely, the problem of republican systems of government with 
superpresidents (albeit in the context of appeals mostly to the phenomenon of 
superpresidentialism) was reflected in the researches of Western European, 
Eastern European and Latin American scientists. On their basis, Fish25 singled out 
the main characteristics of republics with superpresidents: a strong executive 
headed by a president; an accountability of public expenditures and judiciary to 
a president; presidential right to issue decrees exercising the force of law; a 
cancelation or complexity of a president’s impeachment; absence of 
accountability of presidents and executives to legislatures. At the same time, 
Linz26, Clark and Wittrock27 argued that legislative branch of government in 
some republics with superpresidents is formally enshrined together and 
simultaneously in Parliaments and cabinets, but the last one actually are 
governed by presidents. Therefore, Protsyk28, Morgan-Jones and Schleiter29 are 
right indicating that superpresidents’ powers are more effective when they 
combine other institutional components and tools.  
However, according to an empirical analysis of the republics with 
superpresidents made by Sakharov30 and Zaznaev31, it is clear that 
“superpresidentialism” is not a kind of form of government but rather a 
synthetic format of republican system of government. The fact is that 
superpresidentialism as a format of system of government, which is 
characterised by the position of an all-powerful president, can easily be 
attributed to a republican form of government, but it is very difficultly attributed 
to any “pure” or classical system of government. That is why Colton and Skach 
noted that constructions of republican systems of government, characterised by 
                                                                                                                                       
in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 53, no. 8, 2001, 
pp. 1177-1191. 
24
  Steven M. Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005. 
25
  Steven M. Fish, “The Executive Deception: Superpresidentialism and the Degradation of 
Russian Politics”, in Valerie Sperling (ed.), Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and 
the Quest for Democratic Governance, Westview Press, Boulder, 2000, pp. 178-179. 
26
  Juan Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy:…cit.”, p. 63. 
27
  Terry D. Clark, Jill N. Wittrock, “Presidentialism and the Effect of Electoral Law in Post-
Communist Systems”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 38, no. 2, 2005, p. 176. 
28
  Oleg Protsyk, “Ruling with Decrees: Presidential Decree Making in Russia and Ukraine”, 
Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 56, no. 5, 2004, pp. 637-660. 
29
  Edward Morgan-Jones, Petra Schleiter, “Governmental Change in a President-Parliamentary 
Regime: The Case of Russia 1994-2003”, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 20, no. 2, 2004, pp. 123-163. 
30
  Nikolai A. Sakharov, Institut Prezidentstva v Sovremennom Mire, Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 
Moskva, 1994, p. 3. 
31
  Oleg Zaznaev, “Klassifikaciyi Prezidentskoy, Parlamentskoy i Poluprezidentskoy Sistem”, in 
Midhat Farukshin (ed.), Dinamika Politicheskih Sistem i Mezhdunarodnyh Otnosheniy: Vyp. 1, 
Kazanckiy gosudarstvennyj universitet im. V. I. Ul’janova-Lenina, Kazan’, 2006, pp. 186-210. 
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the positions of superpresidents, are diverse in different states. Accordingly, all 
republics with positions of superpresidents can be subdivided into presidential and 
semi-presidential constitutional formats32. For example, Colton and Skach 
proposed to consider Russia33, especially after 200034, as the illustration of semi-
presidential republic with the position superpresident. Holmes35, Fish36, Chaisty37, 
Parrish38, Protsyk39, Shevtsova40 Kliamkin41, Remington, Smith and Haspel42 
made similar conclusions about the superpresidential character of Russian semi-
presidentialism (mostly for the period before 2000, often without the use of the 
term “superpresidentialism”). 
Fish43, Ishiyama and Kennedy44 expanded the problem and structure 
field of republics with superpresidents, applied the outlined concept for Russia, 
Ukraine, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan in the late 90s of the twentieth century and 
linked superpresidentialism with the features of political party development’s 
slowdown. The Latin American republics with superpresidents (in the second half 
                                                        
32
  Timothy J. Colton, Cindy Skach, Semi-Presidentialism in Russia and Post-Communist Europe: 
Ameliorating or Aggravating Democratic Possibilities?, III General Assembly of the Club of 
Madrid, 2004. 
33
  Idem, “Superpresidentialism and Russia’s Backward State”, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 11, 
no. 2, 1995, pp. 144-149. 
34
  Timothy J. Colton, “The Russian Predicament”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, no. 3, 
2005, p. 120. 
35
  Stephen Holmes, “Superpresidentialism…cit.”. 
36
  Steven M. Fish, Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian 
Revolution, Princeton University Press, 1995; Idem, “The Perils of Russian 
Superpresidentialism”, Current History, vol. 96, 1997, pp. 326-330; Idem, “When More Is 
Less: Superexecutive Power and Political Underdevelopment in Russia”, in Victoria E. 
Bonnell,  George W. Breslauer (eds.), Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder?, 
Westview Press, Boulder, 2001, pp. 15-34; Steven M. FISH, Democracy Derailed in 
Russia:…cit. 
37
  Paul Chaisty, “The Legislative Effects of Presidential Partisan Powers in Post-Communist 
Russia”, Government and Opposition, vol. 43, no. 3, 2008, pp. 424-453. 
38
  Scott Parrish, “Presidential Decree Authority in Russia, 1991-1995”, in John M. Carey, 
Matthew S. Shugart (eds.), Executive Decree Authority, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1998, pp. 62-103. 
39
  Oleg Protsyk, “Ruling with Decrees:…cit.”. 
40
  Lilia Shevtsova, “The Problem of Executive Power in Russia”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 
11, no. 1, 2000, pp. 32-39; Idem, Putin’s Russia, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Moscow, 2005. 
41
  Igor Kliamkin, “Rossiyskaya Vlast’ na Rubezhe Tysyacheletiy”, Pro et Contra, vol. 4, no. 2., 
2001, pp. 63-87; Igor Kliamkin, Lilia Shevtsova, Rezhim Borisa Vtorogo. Osobennosti 
postkommunisticheskoy vlasti v Rossiyi, Moscow Carnegie Center, Moscow, 1999. 
42
  Thomas F. Remington, Steven S. Smith, Moshe Haspel, “Decrees, Laws and Inter-Branch 
Relations in the Russian Federation”, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 14, no. 4, 1998, pp. 287-322. 
43
  Steven M. Fish, “The Executive Deception:…cit.”, pp. 177-192. 
44
  John T. Ishiyama, Ryan Kennedy, “Superpresidentialism and Political Party 
Development…cit.”. 
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of the twentieth century) were outlined in the refinements of Linz45 and Orlov46. In 
particular, Orlov based on empirical evidence defined superpresidentialism as 
actually independent, uncontrolled by executive, legislative and judicial branches 
system of government, with dominant hypertrophied presidential powers. For weak 
legislative and parliamentary bodies and underdeveloped party democracy there is no 
institutional force that could balance the influence of the president, who actually 
becomes the centre of political life and transforms not only into the head of the 
executive, but of the nation overall. However, most Latin American constitutional 
systems of are still presidential. Consequently, it is clear that superpresidentialism in 
Latin America initially emerged as tangent to constitutional presidentialism. Heads of 
state in these republics are mostly chosen by election results, but between presidential 
elections, according to Beliaev47 and Kubicek48, they are institutionally defined as 
unlimited political actors. 
Based on the existing acquis concerning republics with superpresidents 
around the world, the scientists argued that different cases could be characterized by 
different degree of superpresidentialism, obtained on different methods and tools of 
measuring presidential powers. In Political Science, there are several well-known 
tools for comparative analysis of presidential powers49. These tools differently assess 
                                                        
45
  Juan Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy:…cit.”, pp. 3-87. 
46
  Anatoliy Orlov, Prezidentskie Respubliki v Latinskoy Amerike, Jurist, Moskva, 1995; 
Idem, Vysshie Organy Gosudarstvennoy Vlasti Stran Latinskoy Ameriki, Ankil, Moskva, 
2001. 
47
  Mikhail V. Beliaev, “Presidential Powers and Consolidation of New Postcommunist 
Democracies”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 39, no. 3, 2006, pp. 375-398. 
48
  Paul Kubicek, “Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine”, Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, vol. 27, no. 4, 1994, pp. 423-441. 
49
  See detailed some of them (in chronological order of their publication): Matthew S. Shugart, John 
M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 148-158; Christian Lucky, “Table of Presidential Powers 
in Eastern Europe”, East European Constitutional Review, vol. 2, no. 4, 1993-1994, pp. 81-94; James 
McGregor, “The Presidency in East Central Europe”, RFR/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, 
pp. 23-31; Joel Hellman, “Constitutions and Economic Reform in the Postcommunist 
Transitions”, East European Constitutional Review, vol. 5, no. 1, 1996, pp. 46-56; Timothy Frye, 
“A Politics of Institutional Choices: Post-Communist Presidencies”, Comparative Political 
Studies, vol. 30, no. 5, 1997, pp. 523-552; Idem, Changes in Post-Communist Presidential Power: 
A Political Economy Explanation, University of Notre Dame, 1999; Steven Roper, “Are All 
Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes”, 
Comparative Politics, vol. 34, no. 3, 2002, pp. 253-272; André Krouwel, “Measuring 
Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: An Application to Central and East European Countries”, 
Acta Politica, vol. 38, no. 4, 2003, pp. 333-364; Alan Siaroff, “Comparative Presidencies: the 
Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Distinction”, European 
Journal of Political Research, vol. 42, no. 3, 2003, pp. 287-312; Andrei Kounov, Eugene Mazo, 
Reexamining Presidential Power in the Post-Soviet States, Stanford University, Stanford, 2004; 
Eugene Mazo, Duverger’s Dilemma: Debating the Uniqueness of Semi-Presidential Constitutions 
in Eastern Europe, Social Science Research Council: Dissertation Development Workshop on 
Governance in Eurasia, Austin: University of Texas, 4-7 March 2004; Elgun A. Taghiyev, 
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the strength of presidents in modern republics, so that we can draw conclusions about 
the relationship between presidential powers in different constitutional systems. 
A large number of scientific works is dedicated to connection between 
republics with superpresidents and democratic or undemocratic regimes. 
Karmazіna50, D. Derbyshire and I. Derbyshire51 unilaterally put republics with 
superpresidents in line with phenomena of dictatorship and tyranny in different 
variations of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Those systems are characterised 
by positions of unlimited presidents. Thus, according to Zaznaev52, Vanden and 
Prevost53, the important point is that the strong (unlimited) powers of presidents are 
not only fixed in constitutions, but also are implemented into practice. In return, 
Fish54 argued that republics with superpresidents are usually undemocratic or 
partially democratic. Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power55 made a similar conclusion and 
noted that nondictatorial republics with superpresidents actually operate according 
to the logic of hybrid forms of government. In addition, the scholars argued that 
superpresidentialism is also interpreted as the formal manifestation of a system of 
neopatrimonialism, which empowers presidents in other ways. Patronal 
presidentialism combines great formal power with informal power and resources 
derived from the networks of patron-client relations that span the state and 
economy56. Therefore, the phenomenon of patrimonial president often equate the 
                                                                                                                                       
“Measuring Presidential Power in Post-Soviet Countries”, CEU Political Science Journal, vol. 3, 
2006, pp. 11-21; Klaus Armingeon, Romana Careja, Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-
Communist Countries, 1989-2007, Institute of Political Science, Bern, 2007; Braulio Gómez 
Fortes, Pedro Magalhaes, Presidential Elections in Semi-Presidential Systems: Presidential 
Powers, Electoral Turnout and the Performance of Government-Endorsed Candidates, Digital 
CSIC, Lisbon, 2008; Jessica Fortin, “Measuring Presidential Powers: Revisiting Existing 
Aggregate Measurement”, International Political Science Review, vol. 34, no. 1, 2013, pp. 91-
112; David Doyle, Robert Elgie, Maximising the Reliability of Cross-National Measures of 
Presidential Power, International Political Science Association biennial conference, Montreal: 
International Political Science Association, 20-24 July 2014; Robert Elgie, Cristina Bucur, 
Bernard Dolez, Annie Laurent, “Proximity, Candidates, and Presidential Power: How 
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General Conference 2014, Glasgow: University of Glasgow, 3-6 September 2014. 
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phenomenon of superpresident, regardless the system of government57. This is 
despite the fact that regular and reasonably or partly free elections usually occur in 
such systems. On this occasion, Beliaev58 argued that superpresidential regimes are 
the most unfavorable environment for democratic consolidation. As a result, 
Chirkin59, Sakharov60 and Zaznaev61 divided republican systems (along with 
presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary constitutional systems) into 
dictatorial and non-dictatorial. Among dictatorial republics, they identified 
presidential-monocratic, presidential-military and presidential-partocratic types.  
However, according to Alekseenko62, the proposed classification does not 
directly relate to the phenomenon of republics with superpresidents. In general, 
existing scientific literature only partially overview the problem of 
superpresidents in republican systems of government. The fact is that scientists 
have not solved the problem of taxonomy of constitutional systems of 
government with superpresidents into clear varieties and types. In addition, the 
phenomenon of superpresident and republics with superpresidents also needs 
elaboration and clarification. Accordingly, the theoretical and methodological 
understanding of the phenomenon of republican systems of government with 
positions of superpresidents and their dichotomy onto formally presidential and 
semi-presidential systems of government is the main objective of the proposed 
scientific exploration and the largest gap of existing scientific literature. Therefore, 
the aim of the study is to ascertain whether it is necessary to distinguish between the 
proposed formats of republican systems of government with superpresidents as 
analytically separate occasions (i.e., to separate superpresidential presidentialism 
and superpresidential semi-presidentialism), or should they be interpreted as a 
definitive entity (i.e., superpresidentialism). 
                                                                                                                                       
Eurasia”, World Politics, vol. 58, no. 1, 2005, pp. 133-165; Ildar Gabdrafikov, Henry E. 
Hale, “Bashkortostan’s Democratic Moment? Patronal Presidentialism, Regional Regime 
Change, and Identity in Russia”, in Osamu Ieda, Tomohiko Uyama (eds.), Reconstruction 
and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds, 21st Century COE Program 
Slavic Eurasian Studies, 2006, pp. 75-104; Keith A. Darden, “Blackmail as a Tool of State 
Domination: Ukraine under Kuchma”, East European Constitutional Review, vol. 10, no. 
2, 2001, pp. 67-71; Oleg Protsyk, “Ruling with Decrees:…cit.”; Paul Chaisty, “The Legislative 
Effects of Presidential Partisan Powers in Post-Communist Russia”, Government and Opposition, 
vol. 43, no. 3, 2008, pp. 424-453; Hans van Zon, “Political Culture and Neopatrimonialism under 
Leonid Kuchma”, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 52, no. 5, 2005, pp. 12-22. 
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Gosudarstvo i Pravo, vol. 4, 1994, pp. 109-115.  
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The Notion, Features, Types and Reasons  
for the Installation of Republics with Superpresidents 
 
Reviewing and processing the abovementioned scientific literature 
allows us to state that the republic with superpresident (superpresidential republic, 
superpresidentialism) is a format of any republican system of government, where 
the president as the head of state (and possibly the chief executive or head of 
executive branch) formally (legally) and/or actually (politically) controls all 
branches and levers of government and state power63. According to Orlov64, 
superpresidentialism is actually independent, uncontrolled in practice by the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches system of government, with 
dominant hypertrophied presidential powers. Considering the ideas of D. 
Derbyshire and I. Derbyshire65, republics with superpresidents are samples of 
republican systems, which are common for different variants of authoritarianism 
and totalitarianism, and are characterised by positions of unlimited presidents 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and other countries are the examples of superpresidential republics). 
Thus, according to Zaznaev66, Vanden and Prevost67, the important point is that 
the strong (unlimited) powers of the president are not only fixed in the 
constitutions, but also are implemented into practice. Moreover, a formally 
strong president can hold additional excessive powers in practice, which he or 
she is not obliged to hold under the constitution. In fact, the president performs 
different functions – he/she is the head of the state, the commander in chief of the 
armed forces, the chief executive, the party leader and even the spiritual leader. 
This means that the actual multiple roles of the presidents greatly enhance the 
already strong formal presidential powers.  
Instead, the Parliaments of republican systems of government with 
superpresidents are entirely or largely advisory bodies of the executive branch 
of government that impress superpresidential decisions. It means that 
                                                        
63
  Such categories as “over-presidentialism” or “hyper-presidentialism” are used in Political 
Science synonymously and closely to the term “superpresidentialism”. See detailed: 
Stephen Holmes, “Superpresidentialism and Its Problems”, East European Constitutional 
Review, vol. 2, no. 4, 1993, pp. 123-126; Juan LINZ, “Presidential or Parliamentary 
Democracy:…cit.”, pp. 5, 76; Anatoliy Orlov, Vysshie Organy Gosudarstvennoy Vlasti 
Stran Latinskoy Ameriki, Ankil, Moskva, 2001, p. 7. 
64
  Ibidem, p. 9. 
65
  Denis Derbyshire, Ian Derbyshire, Political Systems of the World, Palgrave Macmillan, 
1996. 
66
  Oleg Zaznaev, “Klassifikaciyi Prezidentskoy, Parlamentskoy i Poluprezidentskoy Sistem”, cit. 
67
  Harry E. Vanden, Gary Prevost, Politics of Latin America:…cit. 
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superpresidents formally/actually are simultaneously heads of state and heads of 
executive branches of government with extraordinary and extremely extensive 
powers, which subjugate all (legislative, executive and judicial) branches of 
government and all levers of power. Superpresidential powers are hypertrophied, as 
they are not subjected to checks and balances of legislative, executive and judicial 
branches of government. The special feature of the superpresidents is that they are 
mostly chosen without intermediate bodies or authorities under the result of 
direct and nation-wide will expression. It is noteworthy that “over-the-topness” 
of superpresidential powers (hypertrophied superpresidential powers) 
traditionally are caused both formally (by the texts of laws and constitutions) 
and actually (by the presidents’ real powers and actions)68. However, it happens 
that the constitutional powers of superpresidents do not correspond or partially 
correspond to considerably larger superpresidential authority. 
The main and defining features of republican systems of government with 
positons of superpresidents are:  
1. The president is standing as a senior officer, leader or “father” of the 
nation (regardless of the form of government in a given country).  
2. President’s supremacy in the system of government is absolute. 
3. Election of the president for a fixed term usually performed under 
direct and nation-wide vote (in some autocratic forms of government 
superpresidents are elected or appointed for life term). 
4. Positioning of the president as head of state and head of the executive 
branch of government (usually the following powers of presidents have 
constitutional regulation, but sometimes superpresidents formally are 
only the heads of state and actually perform the roles of chiefs 
executive). 
5. Dominance of the executive (presidential-executive) branch over the other 
branches of government (firstly, over parliamentary-legislative branch, 
which is traditionally very weak), resulting in deformation and/or 
absence of systems of checks and balances among the branches of 
government69. 
6.  The president possesses unilateral, extraordinary and extremely extensive 
powers, which can be used in almost all areas of political process 
(including the president’s powers independently and at own discretion to 
                                                        
68
  Anatoliy Orlov, Prezidentskie Respubliki v Latinskoy Amerike, Jurist, Moskva, 1995, 
pp. 9-11. 
69
  In some republics with superpresidents, legislative branch of government is formally 
enshrined together and simultaneously in Parliaments and cabinets, but the last one 
formally or actually are governed by the presidents. See detailed: Terry D. Clark, Jill N. 
Wittrock, “Presidentialism and the Effect of Electoral Law in Post-Communist Systems”, 
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 38, no. 2, 2005, p. 176; John T. Ishiyama, Ryan 
Kennedy, “Superpresidentialism and Political Party Development…cit.”, p. 1179; Juan Linz, 
“Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy:…cit., p. 63. 
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enter or affect the imposition of emergency and/or military situation). 
7. The possession by the president of power to dissolve the parliament or 
leading house of Parliament (independent from the other institutions 
of government right of the president to decide whether to dissolve the 
Parliament or controlled by the other institutions of government right 
of the president to dissolve the Parliament only in pursuant to the 
preconditions and events)70. 
8. The possession by the president of unilateral appointive powers (for 
example, the president can independently appoint or dismiss judges, lawyers, 
managers and prosecutors of national and local government bodies). 
9. The president possesses the right for direct or indirect passing 
regulatory acts, which have legal status or the function of law. 
10. Presidential control over the public media resulted in impossible or 
limited public criticism of government. 
11. The presidential affiliation to the largest and dominant political party 
under the conditions of relative weakness of other political parties those 
are loyal or oppositional to the president71. 
However, in republican systems of government with superpresidents the 
role of political parties might be differentiated. In the first group of countries, there 
are formally installed multiparty systems, but superpresidents are leaning against 
the influence of the dominant parliamentary parties. In the second group of 
countries, there are formally established multiparty systems, but the power and 
position of the parties in such systems is unstable, minor and adventitious, thus 
superpresidents are able to manoeuvre between them, actually intensifying their 
own influence and authority. In the third group of countries, formally there are 
constitutionally established single-party systems or systems with hegemonic parties, 
thus the “party of power” formally and/or actually merges with very significant 
public and political powers of superpresidents. In the fourth group of countries, 
the activity of all or mostly all political parties is prohibited completely, and 
superpresidents mostly come to power after military coups and their rule is 
                                                        
70
  The list of constitutional prerequisites, required in order for the president (in republics 
with superpresidents) to dissolve the Parliament, is quite interesting. For example, the 
Belarusian president may dissolve the houses of Parliament because of the Constitutional 
Court conclusion in the case of systematic and gross violations of the constitution by the 
houses of Parliament (Article 94 of the Constitution). That is why the adoption on recognition 
constitutionality of the law in the Constitutional Court may be the cause of premature 
dissolution of Parliament. Instead, the Russian president may dissolve the State Duma 
(lower house of Parliament) when it re-expresses a vote of no confidence in the 
government (which at first was rejected by the president) or rejects a candidate for the 
prime minister proposed by the president for three times. See detailed: Yana Baris’ka, “Novіtnі 
Nadprezidents’kі Respublіki: Teoretiko-Pravovі Aspekti”, Vіsnik Akademіyi Pravovih Nauk 
Ukrayini, vol. 4, no. 59, 2009, p. 6. 
71
  Scott Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave Democracies: The Case of 
Brazil, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1999, pp. 274-275. 
VITALIY S. LYTVYN 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XV  no. 2  2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
302 
based on impact of the military junta. The political systems in republics with 
superpresidents are determined by the party systems’ instability that acts as 
addition to the state machine, which is supported by the establishment of control 
over the parties’ activity72.  
For weak legislative and parliamentary bodies and underdeveloped party 
democracy there is no force that could balance the influence of the president, who 
actually becomes the centre of political life and transforms not only into the head 
of the executive branch of government, but of the nation overall73. In addition, the 
systems with superpresidents are narrowing the arenas of government, state and 
management decisions, which traditionally are taken on party-political arena, to 
decisions of specially selected technocrats. The process of making technocratic 
decisions prevents development of democratic principles of competition and 
participation, and therefore leaves the presidential-executive branch of government 
of any structural and systematic accountability to the legislature. This in turn 
clearly shows that regardless of whether there is a formal balance of the constitutional 
system of government, the political process is actually dominated by the 
president, whose powers significantly exceed the powers of other government 
bodies. Obviously, this leads to a government of autocratic/monocratic form, 
which typically shifts focus to the president on the part of all or most state 
agencies, where there is no electoral or liberal democracy, and human rights and 
freedoms are only formal and even of a fictitious character. 
Nonetheless, Political Science fractured different interpretations of 
correlations with superpresidents and forms of government, which they conduct 
or to which they can lead. Thus, Sakharov74 notes that republics with 
superpresidents in the context of forms of governments are to be distinguished 
between dictatorial and nondictatorial systems. Dictatorial systems of government 
with superpresidents are usually republican systems of government, where 
superpresidents fully exercise their power because of actual weakening of other 
branches/institutions of government and civil society. These republican systems 
of government are largely peculiar to totalitarianism/authoritarianism. Traditionally, 
superpresidents-dictators are peculiar to presidential-monocratic, presidential-military 
and presidential-partocratic republics75. Nondictatorial systems of government 
                                                        
72
  Examples of the first group of countries are Azerbaijan (the Party “New Azerbaijan”), 
Russia (the Party “United Russia”); the second group is Belarus; the third group is the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; the fourth group is Chile in times of “pinocracy” 
(government of Pinochet). 
73
  Anatoliy Orlov, Prezidentskie Respubliki…cit.. 
74
  Nikolai A. Sakharov, Institut Prezidentstva v Sovremennom Mire, Yuridicheskaya 
Literatura, Moskva, 1994, pp. 14-25. 
75
  Noted types of dictatorial systems with superpresidents, considering the natural dominance 
of heads of state in the structure of the government, were distinguished by Chirkin and 
Zaznaev. 1. Presidential-monocratic republican system of government is system of 
government with dictatorial superpresident, where the head of state, sometimes proclaimed 
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with superpresidents are usually republican systems of government, where 
superpresidents fully exercise their powers from the constitutional regulations 
and only confirm them actually. These are not necessarily autocratic republics, 
but they definitely fear threats and risks of a shift from electoral democracy 
(hybrid government) to authoritarianism. 
Taking into account the definition given by O’Donnell76 and remarks 
given by Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power77 it is obvious that nondictatorial 
republics with positions of superpresidents actually operate according to the logic of 
hybrid forms of government or so-called “defective or delegative democracies”. 
“Defectiveness” or “delegativeness” of democracy is explained by the 
constitutional president’s concentration of powers in systems of government, 
especially in the executive and legislative branches of government, which tend to 
decrease in importance/impact of the institutional and political constraints, 
especially on the part of political parties and Parliaments78. Consequently, 
superpresidents between presidential elections are institutionally defined as 
unlimited political actors, and electoral process is determined with open 
                                                                                                                                       
as president for a life, heads the only allowed party in country, and such party is the carrier of 
the declared and mandatory official state ideology. Examples: Ghana during the 
government of Kwame (1960-1966), Guinea during the government of Sekou Toure (1958-
1984), Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) in the days of Mobutu Sese Seko (1965-
1997), North Korea in times of Kim Il Sung (1972-1998), Equatorial Guinea (since 1979), 
Tunisia (1957-2011), Uganda (particularly in 1971-1979) etc. 2. Presidential-military 
republican system of government is a dictatorial system of government with superpresident, 
where the head of state gets superauthority as the result of a military coup. Examples: Chile 
(1973-1990), Indonesia (1967-1998). 3. Presidential-partocratic republican system of 
government is a dictatorial system of government with superpresident, where a head of state 
is chosen by a single highest body in the country, typically the socialist/communist party 
(e.g., the Soviet Union, Angola (since 1979), Benin (1975-1991), Mozambique (since 1975) 
etc.). The feasibility of separation of nondictatorial republican systems with superpresidents is 
obvious in view of the conclusion given by Alekseenko. He partially denied the 
classification of republics with superpresidents, which had been provided by Chirkin and 
Zaznaev. The researcher argued that the classification is obsolete, because the authors had not 
taken into account the characteristics of republicanism with superpresidents in countries that 
are not monocratic (single-party), partocratic or military states (including the example of some 
post-Soviet countries, i.e. Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan etc.). See detailed: Igor Alekseenko, “Superprezidents’ka Respublіka yak 
Paradigma Vzaemodіi Polіtichnih Іnstitutіv”, Ekonomіchnyy Chasopys – XXI: Naukovyy 
Zhurnal, vol. 7-8, 2010, pp. 14-17; Veniamin E. Chirkin, Konstitucionnoe Pravo 
Zarubezhnyh Stran, Jurist, Moskva, 1997, pp. 145-146; Oleg Zaznaev, “Klassifikaciyi 
Prezidentskoy, Parlamentskoy i Poluprezidentskoy Sistem”, cit.. 
76
  Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 1, 
1994, pp. 55-69; Idem, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies”, Journal of 
Democracy, vol. 9, no. 3, 1998, pp. 112-126; Idem, “Illusions about Consolidation”, 
Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 2, 1996, pp. 34-51. 
77
  Paul Chaisty, Nic Cheeseman, Timothy Power, Rethinking the “Presidentialism Debate”…cit. 
78
  Steven M. Fish, “Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies”, Journal of Democracy, 
vol. 17, no. 1, 2006, pp. 5-20. 
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manipulations. This leads to a formalisation of concentrated and centralised powers 
of presidents, especially their proactive legislative powers, which include the right 
to issue decrees with the force of law and the right to arbitrate interinstitutional 
conflicts in the system of separation of governments’ branches79. 
Instead, Karmazіna80 unilaterally puts republics with superpresidents in line 
with such phenomena as dictatorship (civil or military dictatorship) and tyranny. The 
researcher notes that while talking about the rise of the institution of presidency 
over traditional branches of government, and even more – about its exaltation over 
all institutions of the state … more acceptable equivalent is … one of the following 
concepts: a superpresidential republic, dictatorship, tyranny etc. A similar 
conclusion was made by Fish81. However, he notes that republican systems of 
government with superpresidents, while not being democratic, could be half-
democratic. The difference between half-democratic and “pure” authoritarian 
forms of government, according to researchers, is the presence of regular and 
reasonably free elections. On the one hand, it is true, but on the other hand, the 
gradual strengthening of powers of superpresidents leads to the process of 
concentration of all the state power and influence, which is more consistent with 
the principles of democracy, but not autocracy. Here lies the anti-institutional 
prejudice of the republics with superpresidents, outlined with the fact, that 
superpresidents are not interested in development of institutions that could 
potentially threaten their formal and/or actual power in system of government. 
That is exactly, in the words of Anderson et al.82, the difference between 
republican system of government with superpresident and any other republican 
system of government, which is characterised by the dispersal of government 
institutions. Therefore, according to Fish83, the main characteristics of republics 
with superpresident are the following:  
1. There is a presence of a strong executive staff headed by the 
president who “overshadows” other public authorities in terms of 
power resources. 
2. There is an accountability of all or almost all of the public 
expenditures to the president. 
3. The president has a right to issue decrees exercising the force of law. 
4. There is an accountability of the judiciary to the president, so that the 
                                                        
79
 Mikhail V. Beliaev, “Presidential Powers and Consolidation of New Postcommunist 
Democracies”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 39, no. 3, 2006, pp. 375-398; Paul Kubicek, 
“Delegative democracy…cit.”. 
80
 Maria Karmazіna, “Іnstitut Prezidentstva: Pohodzhennya ta Sutnіst’ Fenomena”, Polіtichniy 
Menedzhment, vol. 3, no. 6, 2004, p. 37. 
81
 Steven M. Fish, “The Executive Deception:…cit.”. 
82
 Richard D. Anderson, Steven M. Fish, Stephen E. Hanson, Philip G. Roeder, 
Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy, Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 83-
84. 
83
 Steven M. Fish, “The Executive Deception:…cit.”, pp. 178-179. 
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president and his activity/inactivity cannot be subjected to judicial 
investigation. 
5. There is a cancelation/complexity of a president’s impeachment. 
6. There is no accountability of president and presidential-executive 
powers to the legislature.  
Consequently, it is obvious that almost all undemocratic and half-
democratic republics with superpresidents are institutional constructs of the so-
called “patronymic presidentialism” or neopatrimonialism, which according to 
Hale, combines extensive formal and actual powers of presidents with all 
available potential resources, received from the patron-client relations in the 
politics and economy of a country84. This directly implies that “superpresidents’ 
authorisation” and “limitation” of institutional checks and balances occur in all 
possible ways, even at the expense of alternative centres of state power. This is 
largely typical for post-Soviet countries in which the institution of president was 
introduced on the heritage of the Soviet political culture that enabled ruling 
through the mechanisms of patronage and personal management85. Hence, very 
strong and powerful presidents (superpresidents) in those countries actually 
coexist with very weak Parliaments that use relatively low levels of public 
confidence. Linz’s remark is not always relevant in the sense that the instability of 
the position of a strong, popularly elected president is a direct consequence of the 
dual legitimacy of government in the construction of divided elections of the 
president and Parliament. On the contrary, a source of instability of 
superpresident’s position is the excessive concentration in his hands of redundant 
powers and resources that are not based on the trust of the population and 
extrapolated in the form of the parliamentary parties’ support86. Therefore, 
                                                        
84
  Henry E. Hale, “Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet 
Eurasia”, World Politics, vol. 58, no. 1, 2005, p. 138. 
85
  Among the post-Soviet states, “patronal presidentialism” first off all is peculiar to 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, and was earlier peculiar for Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine. Under patronymic 
presidentialism it is understood not a republican system of government, but a management 
system, where the president, which is elected directly by citizens, is much more powerful 
than other institutions of power. In addition, the authority of the head of state is based not 
only on the formally specified powers, but also on the patron-client relations in the 
country. See detailed: Keith A. Darden, “Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: 
Ukraine under Kuchma”, East European Constitutional Review, vol. 10, no. 2, 2001, 
pp. 67-71; Ildar Gabdrafikov, Henry E. Hale, “Bashkortostan’s Democratic Moment? 
Patronal Presidentialism, Regional Regime Change, and Identity in Russia”, in Osamu 
Ieda, Tomohiko Uyama (eds.), Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its 
Neighboring Worlds, 21st Century COE Program Slavic Eurasian Studies, 2006, pp. 75-104; 
Henry E. Hale, “Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet 
Eurasia”, World Politics, vol. 58, no. 1, 2005, pp. 133-165; Neil Robinson, “The 
Presidency: the Politics of Institutional Chaos”, in Idem (ed.), Institutions and Political 
Change in Russia, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000. 
86
  Paul Chaisty, Nic Cheeseman, Timothy Power, Rethinking the “Presidentialism Debate”…cit.; 
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Protsyk87, Morgan-Jones and Schleiter88 are right indicating that the power of 
superpresidents is more effective when it combines other institutional components 
and tools. This way, for example, the superpresidents’ authority to implement the 
legislative process and form a cabinet are crucial resources of the heads of state’ 
strength, when they are endowed with the confidence of parliamentary parties 
and tools of parliamentary control over the legislative process89. 
Among the reasons for the installation of republics with superpresidents, 
scientists often distinguish the processes associated with the curtailment of 
democratic reforms in a country. With this in mind, it is clear that the republican 
systems of government with superpresidents lead to a number of negative 
impacts and trends of socioeconomic and political developments. First, the 
phenomenon and role of superpresidency and vertical monocratic direction of the 
presidential powers leads to the impossibility of democratic government’s 
installation for medium and long terms. Second, the concentration of power in the 
hands of one person (superpresident) and high dependency of socioeconomic and 
political processes on the person or group of persons (“family”), who are related 
to the president, institutionalise the practice of absolutism, in terms of which the 
republican system of government resembles a monarchical form of government. 
Third, subordination of all branches of government to the superpresident leads to 
fictitious and limited human and civil rights, weakness and even lack of 
political or social opposition and to marginalisation of the party and electoral 
                                                                                                                                       
Thomas F. Remington, Steven S. Smith, Moshe Haspel, “Decrees, Laws and Inter-Branch 
Relations in the Russian Federation”, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 14, no. 4, 1998, pp. 287-322. 
87
  Oleg Protsyk, “Ruling with Decrees:…cit.”. 
88
  Edward Morgan-Jones, Petra Schleiter, “Governmental Change in a President-Parliamentary 
Regime:…cit.”. 
89
  Reflecting of this is the fact that, for example, superpresidents of post-Soviet countries have 
become increasingly dependent on the parties they represent, as well as on some other parties, 
measured by presidents as institutionally reliable. As a result, there are more or less stable 
models of coalition cooperation within the Parliaments, into which superpresidents are 
incorporated. These examples of cooperation can be coalitions (earlier in Armenia, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan) or can, as result of co-optation processes, be finished with the formation of so-
called “parties of power”, which include those former parties that were previously independent 
members of coalitions (e.g., Azerbaijan, Russia). In a particular case, coalitions and “parties of 
power” serve as an institutional tool, which provides social and political trust for the president, 
and actually enhance his/her legislative powers or all presidential powers to influence the 
activities of parliament. On the other hand, superpresidents informally influence the formation 
of coalitions in different ways. The ways to distinguish informal influence include such steps, 
as providing particularistic interests and lobby parliamentarians, bribery, patronage and 
intimidation of voters and parliamentarians. See detailed: Paul Chaisty, “The Legislative Effects of 
Presidential Partisan Powers in Post-Communist Russia”, Government and Opposition, vol. 43, 
no. 3, 2008, pp. 424-453; Oleksiy Haran, “From Viktor to Viktor: Democracy and 
Authoritarianism in Ukraine”, Democratisation, vol. 19, no. 2, 2011, pp. 93-110; Hans van Zon, 
“Political Culture and Neopatrimonialism under Leonid Kuchma”, Problems of Post-
Communism, vol. 52, no. 5, 2005, pp. 12-22. 
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systems. Fourth, concentration of all powers in the superpresident’s hands leads to 
the possibility of abuse of power in socioeconomic, political and other issues of 
public and/or personal developments. The experience of the most of republican 
systems with superpresidents in the world shows that this format of 
republicanism leads to economic and social decline, humanitarian collapse and 
national degradation. In return, republican systems with superpresidents rarely 
contribute to economic growth and modernisation (Pinochet’s era in Chile or 
Suharto’s era in Indonesia). 
 
 
Superpresidentialism, Presidential 
and Semi-Presidential Republics with Superpresidents 
 
According to an empirical analysis of the republics with superpresidents 
made by Sakharov90 and Zaznaev91, “superpresidentialism” is not a kind of “form 
of government” but rather a synthetic format of a “republican system of 
government”. The fact is that superpresidentialism as a format of system of 
government, which is characterised by the position of an all-powerful president, 
can easily be attributed to a republican form of government, but it is very 
difficultly attributed to any “pure” or classical system of government. This is 
because within each of them (often in the case of presidentialism and semi-
presidentialism), there could be formally provided and/or actually implemented the 
position of very strong president (superpresident). He or she dominates not just 
the executive branch, which can be a constitutional feature of presidents in all 
presidential and some semi-presidential systems of republican government, 
however all branches of government. Accordingly, the theoretical, methodological 
and empirical context, especially given by official (constitutional) options and 
features of defining systems of government, accumulates the differentiation of 
various types/formats of republics with superpresident, including presidential 
republic with superpresidents and semi-presidential republic with superpresidents 
(in trichotomous approach of government classification, it is appropriate to call 
them respectively “superpresidentialism” and “super semi-presidentialism”).  
There are several reasons to distinguish presidential and semi-presidential 
republics with superpresidents, which in the trichotomous approach of government 
classification represent quite different analytical perspectives, but in the 
dichotomous approach represent the only “synthetic whole” usually called 
superpresidentialism.  
First, there is a divergent formal and constitutional logic of operation of 
presidential and semi-presidential systems of government with superpresidents. 
                                                        
90
  Nikolai A. Sakharov, Institut Prezidentstva…cit., p. 3. 
91
  Oleg Zaznaev, “Klassifikaciyi Prezidentskoy, Parlamentskoy i Poluprezidentskoy Sistem”, cit. 
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Referring to the definition of Elgie, it should be noted that presidentialism is a 
constitutional system of republican form of government, which inherits the 
position of popularly (directly or indirectly) elected president (head of state), for a 
fixed term, and cabinet or administration of the president (and possibly even of the 
prime minister). The members of the cabinet or presidential administration are 
collectively responsible only to the president. Instead, semi-presidentialism is a 
constitutional system of a republican form of government, which preserves the 
position of popularly (directly or indirectly) elected president (head of state), for a 
fixed term. The prime minister and the cabinet are obligatory and collectively 
responsible to the Parliament (simultaneously the prime minister and the cabinet 
can be collectively responsible to the Parliament and to the president). That is why in 
presidential republican systems of government the cabinet or the administration 
of the president is not in a hierarchical relationship with the Parliament: they are 
not formed in Parliament, do not get a vote of confidence from the Parliament 
and are not accountable to the Parliament. Vice versa, in semi-presidential 
republican systems of government, the cabinet is at least formally in the hierarchical 
relationship with the Parliament, as the latter gives the cabinet a vote of 
confidence (Parliament is involved in the formation/approval of the cabinet 
composition and/or program) and can dismiss the cabinet on the basis of the 
vote of no confidence. Accordingly, in the trichotomous approach of 
government classification the case with the position of a very strong president 
in presidentialism should be interpreted as presidentialism with superpresident 
(superpresidentialism), and the case with the position of a very strong president 
in semi-presidentialism should be interpreted as semi-presidentialism with 
superpresident (super semi-presidentialism). 
Second, power functions and roles of superpresidents in presidential and 
semi-presidential republican systems of government are structurally differentiated 
in relation of formal and actual powers of presidents. Certainly, monistic models 
of executive power established in presidential republics, and powers of 
presidents and Parliaments are functionally separated, so that presidents are 
responsible for the exercise of executive power, Parliaments – for the exercise of 
legislative power. Instead, in semi-presidential systems, different forms of the 
dualistic model of executive power are approved, and powers of presidents, 
cabinets and Parliaments sometimes overlap. This, for example, can be seen in 
some legislative prerogatives of presidents and/or cabinets etc. At the same 
time, sometimes in presidential republics, superpresidents may interfere in the 
legislative powers of Parliaments, and in semi-presidential republics may 
encroach on the role of Parliaments in the process of cabinet formation and 
provision of cabinet support. For example, in semi-presidential states, such as 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia (as well as earlier in Armenia and 
Georgia), where the position of strong president is provided, participation of the 
Parliament in provision of a vote of confidence for a cabinet is regulated, and a 
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candidate for the prime minister is suggested by the president. However, when 
after a set number of times in a row, the candidate for the position of the head of 
cabinet is not approved and the cabinet is not formed in the Parliament, the 
president is vested with the power to dissolve the Parliament and form the 
cabinet independently. It means that such semi-presidential systems of 
government with superpresidents may actually begin to function as presidential 
systems of government with superpresidents at any point of time. Somewhat 
divergent problems in classification of contemporary formally semi-presidential 
republican systems of government we can find in Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan (and earlier in Georgia). The question is how to organise the 
republican systems of government, where the Parliament has the right to put 
forward a vote or censure of no confidence for the cabinet, but the latter takes 
effect only if the president supports it. These self-evident anomalies of 
constitutional semi-presidentialism (or semi-presidentialism as a constitutional 
system of government) with positions of very strong presidents 
(superpresidents) often in practice lead to semi-presidential systems with 
superpresidents being interpreted as presidential systems with superpresidents. 
The inverse problem is inherent in presidential constitutional systems of 
republican government with superpresidents, but at the same time with the 
positions of prime ministers, appointed by presidents without consent or by 
obtaining consent of parliaments (such process occurs in Guyana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Korea, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, earlier in Belarus and Georgia 
etc.). On the contrary, there is no position of prime minister in “pure” or classic 
presidentialism, because the cabinet or presidential administration is directly 
headed by the president. Instead, presidential republics with prime ministers 
approved by Parliaments partially approximate to the semi-presidential republics. 
Therefore, in scientific and political discourse (even within the trichotomous 
approach to systems of government classification) superpresidentialism is 
mistakenly defined as a synthetic form of semi-presidentialism and presidentialism 
with very strong presidents or as a system of government not based on formal 
(constitutional) and/or actual (political) prerequisites of interinstitutional 
relations concerning the exercise of state power. Instead, superpresidentialism is 
only based on the comprehensiveness of presidential powers in relation to other 
branches of government and political system as a whole. 
Third, the phenomenon of superpresidentialism as a form of the republican 
system of government with superpresidents was initially designed in relation to 
presidential systems with very strong presidents. The term “superpresidentialism” 
was first proposed in Political Science to distinguish Latin American countries in 
the ХІХ–ХХ centuries as examples of systems of government, which formally 
being presidential republics, differed from the “pure”/classic presidentialism. 
Majority of presidential republics in Latin America during this period influenced the 
practice of “American” classic presidentialism. However, due to various political, 
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historical and socioeconomic characteristics of the countries in this region, their 
political systems largely did not approve effective mechanisms of control, checks and 
balances. Therefore, they were established as authoritarian forms of government and 
quasi-constitutional practices with superpresidents. This, for example, 
manifested in the fact that presidential positions in almost all countries in the 
region were closely associated with armed forces. Moreover, by the end of the 
ХХ century the army was traditionally considered as the key player in the 
overthrow of presidents in Latin American countries92. Historically, systems of 
semi-presidential government in this region were hardly represented, which 
resulted in the creation of a theoretical and methodological orientation of 
superpresidentialism at presidential systems of republican government in Latin 
America. Therefore, it is clear that superpresidentialism initially emerged as tangent 
to constitutional presidentialism. The problem was that superpresidentialism as a 
system of republicanism was determined solely on the position of a strong president 
(superpresident), bypassing institutional peculiarities of branches of government 
correlations, started being applied in relation to other, first of all semi-
presidential, variants of republican systems of government93. Therefore, there was 
a significant theoretical and methodological gap in perception of 
superpresidentialism as a form of republican system of government in Political 
Science. The essence of the gap is that the interpretation of superpresidentialism 
exclusively as a system of government with the position of a very strong president 
occurs asymmetrically in the context of the formal and actual evaluation of the 
presidents’ powers and separation of republican systems of government. Therefore, 
from a scientific point of view, the rule, which was established earlier, turned out to 
be erroneous, which said that a system of superpresidentialism unilaterally includes 
all formally presidential and semi-presidential republics, where positions of 
superpresidents are inherent formally and/or actually, and they incorporate all 
branches of state power. Instead, it is more appropriate to mark out the system of 
superpresidentialism in broad and narrow senses, and to distinguish between 
presidential and semi-presidential systems of government with superpresidents. 
In a broad sense, superpresidentialism is a variant of the republican 
system of government, in which a fully or nearly uncontrolled and strong president 
(superpresident) is inherent. In a narrow sense, superpresidentialism is a variant of 
a purely presidential system of government, in which an uncontrolled and strong 
president (superpresident) is inherent. It means that in a narrow sense some 
examples of purely formal presidential republics can be superpresidential 
systems, and in a broad sense, some examples not only of formal presidential, but 
                                                        
92
  Lidija R. Basta Fleiner, Governmental Systems in Multicultural Societies, Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation, 2005. 
93
  Veniamin E. Chirkin, “Netipichnye Formy Pravleniya v Sovremennom Gosudarstve”, 
Gosudarstvo i Pravo, vol. 4, 1994, pp. 109-115; Anatoliy Orlov, Prezidentskie 
Respubliki…cit. 
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also of formal semi-presidential republics (parliamentary republics usually cannot 
be superpresidential, at least because superpresidents are incorporated into the 
positions of popularly elected heads of state). It suggests that the phenomenon 
of superpresidents must be treated separately, considering not only the strength 
of the actual powers of the presidents, but also the formal and constitutional 
features of republican systems of government, the role and the place of the 
presidents and Parliaments in the structure of branches of government. This is 
especially true in the context of formation and termination of cabinets and 
cabinets’ powers. In return, in a broad sense, it predetermines the need for 
distinguishing at least two variants of republican systems of government, in 
which the positions of superpresidents can be inherent, i.e. presidentialism and 
semi-presidentialism with the positions of superpresidents. However, it does not mean 
that special cases of presidentialism and semi-presidentialism with superpresidents 
can both be the examples of superpresidentialism in the narrow sense. 
Obviously, presidentialism with position of a superpresident is a 
constitutional presidential system of republican government with the position of 
an all-powerful superpresident, who formally being the head of state and/or 
simultaneously the head of cabinet/executive power effectively subjugates all 
branches of government. It is true, even if the president have the position of 
subordinated prime minister who is not accountable to the Parliament. 
Semi-presidentialism with position of a superpresident is a 
constitutional semi-presidential (primarily president-parliamentary) system of 
republican government with the position of an all-powerful superpresident, who 
formally being the head of state and/or simultaneously the head of 
cabinet/executive power actually subjugates all branches of government. It is 
true, even if the president have the position of either subordinated or 
unsubordinated prime minister who is compulsory accountable to the 
Parliament or its leading chamber.  
Presidentialism with the position of a superpresident has inherent 
independence or very low dependence of the executive branch, represented by 
the head of state (with or without the position of prime minister) on the alignment of 
political forces (especially parties) in the Parliament. This means that regardless of the 
composition of the Parliament, the president (superpresident) is omnipotent, and 
any candidate for the prime minister in case of existence of such a position does not 
affect the actual powers of a superpresident (or actual presidentialisation of 
presidential republic).  
Instead, semi-presidentialism with the position of a superpresident has 
inherent dependence on the alignment of political forces in the Parliament of the 
executive branch, represented by the prime minister or the prime minister and 
the head of the state, of various degrees (low/ high). This implies that 
constitutionally powerful superpresident may actually strengthen his/her powers 
in the event of dissolution of the Parliament. It may follow the parliamentary 
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disagreement about the candidacy of the prime minister (in the case of a refusal 
of the parliament to give a vote of confidence), proposed by the president, or 
president’s reluctance to implement the decision of the Parliament of a vote of no 
confidence in the cabinet. This means that most often in the semi-presidential systems 
with the position of a superpresident, the prime minister is politically weightless a 
priori, regardless of whether the prime minister is politically and/or party 
subordinated or unsubordinated to the president in the context of the balance of 
political parties in the Parliament. With this in mind, it is clear why in some 
semi-presidential systems with superpresidents, there are frequently used majority 
or mixed electoral systems that lead to the representation of nonparty MPs. The 
reason is that actual increase of superpresidents’ powers is probably more possible 
in the case of significant fragmentation of Parliaments, which because of their lack 
of structuring do not always fully perform and try to perform the proper functions 
of political institutions, which have to stabilise the presidents’ powers over the 
exercise of state power. Instead, the exact type of electoral systems in 
presidential systems with superpresidents is actually irrelevant in the process and 
context of presidentialisation of superpresidents. This includes systems of coalitional 
presidentialism. The thing is even parties, which are in a coalitional opposition to 
the superpresident, cannot actually reduce or increase the formal and 
constitutional presidentialisation of the head of state regarding his or her 
exercise of the functions of chief executive. This is less typical for the systems of 
presidentialism where the positions of prime ministers are provided alongside the 
positions of superpresidents. Therefore, it should be noted that presidential 
governments with superpresidents institutionally are more stable than semi-
presidential governments with superpresidents. The former have no need and/or 
usage for shifting to a more presidentialised model of republican system of 
government, and the latter have constitutionally conditioned “shifting potential” 
in certain phases of their operation to more effectively presidentialised systems, even 
resorting to the practice of presidentialism with the positions of superpresidents. 
Comparative analysis of the actual examples of republican governments’ 
systems with the positions of superpresidents based on appeal to the formal 
constitutional and actual political powers of heads of states, cabinets and 
Parliaments supports theoretical and methodological conclusion of the 
practicability to distinguish between systems of presidentialism and semi-
presidentialism with positions of superpresidents.  
For example, Angola (since 1979), Guyana (since 1980), Guinea (since 
1984), Guinea Bissau (since 1980), North Korea (since 1948), Uzbekistan (since 
1991), Tajikistan (since 1994), Turkmenistan (since 1991) and other countries are 
contemporary instances of presidentialism with the positions of superpresidents 
(or superpresidentialism in a narrow sense). Instead, Benin (1975-1991), 
Guatemala (especially in 1944-1986), Ghana (1960-1992), Honduras (especially 
in 1956-1982), Dominican Republic (1966-1978), Colombia (especially in 
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1953-1958), Costa Rica (particularly by 1948), Libya (1969-2011), Mexico 
(especially in 1884-1910 and 1946-1994), Nicaragua (especially in 1937-1987), 
Panama (especially in 1968-1978), Paraguay (particularly in 1814-1840, 1940-
1948 and 1954-1989), Chile (especially in 1817-1826 and 1974-1990), Syria (1971-
2012), Zambia (1964-1991), Zimbabwe (1987-2008), Mali (especially in 1979-
1991 and 2002-2012), Yugoslavia (1953-1980), Indonesia (1945-1998), Philippines 
(1966-1981), Malawi (1966-1994), Uganda (particularly in 1971-1979), Tunisia 
(1957-2011), Equatorial Guinea (1979-2011), CAR (1966-1976), Congo (1965-
1997), the USA (particularly in 1963-1969 and 1969-1974)94, Belarus (1994-
1996)95, Georgia (1995-2004), Gabon (1973-1991), Egypt (1981-2007), Maldives 
(1968-2008), Cameroon (1960-1991), Mozambique (1975-1990), Peru (especially 
in 1919-1930), Rwanda (1973-1994), Togo (1967-1992) etc. were the historical 
examples of presidentialism with the positions of superpresidents. 
In contrast, Azerbaijan (since 1995), Belarus (since 1996), Armenia (1995-
2005), Gabon (since 1991), Georgia (2004-2013), Equatorial Guinea (since 2011), 
Kazakhstan (since 1993), Egypt (2007-2011), Cameroon (since 1991), 
Mozambique (since 1990), Namibia (since 1990), Peru (1979-1992 and since 
1993), Russia (since 1993), Rwanda (since 2003), Syria (since 2012), Togo (since 
1992), Sri Lanka (since 1976), the Philippines (1981-1986), France (1962-1974 
and 1981-1986)96 and other countries were or still are the examples of semi-
                                                        
94
  Wilson outlined the phenomenon of “American presidentialism” in the XX century, as 
“congressional system of government”. At this time, the US Congress dominated the 
political life in the US. In contrast, in the XX century the position of the US being a case of 
“pure” or classic presidentialism was accepted. At the same time, during the presidency of 
Johnson and Nixon, the system was called imperial presidency, because the Congress was 
overshadowed. 
95
  Belarus in 1994-1996 (as well as Georgia in 1995-2004 and Ukraine in 1995-1996) was 
formally considered a presidential republic with a prime minister. However, it was 
actually the position of the superpresident that was inherent. The thing is that according to 
the 1994 Constitution, the collective responsibility of the cabinet, which was headed by the 
“minister of state” (or the prime minister), to the Parliament of Belarus was not regulated. 
Various ministerial positions were to be individually approved by legislature. However, 
once they were approved, only the president could dismiss them. Such model was 
designed as a synthetic one by the examples of the USA and Russia. As a result, the 
position of president was singled out “above” the branches of government, formally 
concentrating upon it not only the functions of the head of state, but also the functions of 
the chief executive. 
96
  Some researchers have suggested outlining the political system of France during 1962-
1974 and 1981-1986 as the “hyper-presidential phase” of semi-presidentialism. The actual 
experience of existence of superpresident positions in France at that time and the experience 
of cohabitation became the key reason for the gradual reduction of the formal powers of 
the presidents of France. In 2000, president terms were reduced from seven years to five, 
and in 2006, it was regulated that the position of the president of France should be 
“comprehensively controlled”. As a result, actual presidentialisation of parties, competition 
and political process in general were reduced. See detailed: John. T.S. Keeler, Martin. A. Schain, 
“Institutions, Political Poker, and Regime Evolution in France”, in Kurt von Mettenheim (ed.), 
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presidentialism with the positions of superpresidents (but not 
superpresidentialism in a narrow sense). 
The formal and actual difference of various presidential and semi-
presidential republics with superpresidents lies in the fact that contemporary 
superpresidents can be inherent by:  
1. The republics, where presidents’ superpowers are established 
constitutionally (usually, these are presidential republican systems);  
2. The republics, where presidents are not or not fully provided with 
superpowers, but the extraordinary advantage of the state power 
division is masked (usually, these are semi-presidential republican 
systems of).  
The peculiarity of presidential republics with superpresidents is explained 
by the fact that their range of potential implementation of presidents’ constitutional 
emergency powers is wider than of “pure” or classic presidential republics, as 
well as presidential and semi-presidential republic with superpresidents. This, for 
instance, is evident in the fact that superpresidents in formally presidential 
republican systems of government have constitutional powers to issue the 
decrees, which have the power of law, to dismiss the Parliaments with their 
unilateral decisions, to displace the ministers and heads of territorial units etc. 
Besides, election and establishment of superpresident in presidential system may 
cause changes in the principle of periodical election of new president and 
establishment of lifetime presidency, even because of the referendum or voting 
of Parliament, fully controlled by a president. Election and establishment of 
superpresident in presidential system of government may also cause appointment 
of new president by the decision of preceding president with the following 
formal and electoral approval of this decision (by Parliament or another 
authorized body). 
The peculiarity of semi-presidential republics with superpresidents, 
according to Fish97 and Shevtsova98, lies in the fact that they are characterised by 
an excessive and superpowerful executive branch, unbalanced either by the 
legislative or judicial branch of government and unaccountable to them. This 
undermines the legitimacy of government, leads to authoritarian tendencies, 
suppresses or hinders development of nongovernmental political organisations, 
hinders the formation of efficient government and responsible cabinet. 
                                                                                                                                       
Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, pp. 84-105; Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova, “The 
Contemporary ‘Models’ of Government: Dilemmas and Challenges”, Iustinianus Primus Law 
Review, vol. 2, no. 1, 2011, pp. 1-26.  
97
  Steven M. Fish, Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian 
Revolution, Princeton University Press, 1995; Idem, “The Perils of Russian 
Superpresidentialism”, Current History, vol. 96, 1997, pp. 326-330. 
98
  Lilia Shevtsova, “The Problem of Executive Power in Russia”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 11, 
no. 1, 2000, pp. 32-39. 
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According to the world practice (partially represented by the above 
suggested examples of republics with superpresidents), the practicability of 
allotment of semi-presidential systems of government with superpresidents is 
first of all caused by the practice of post-Soviet and other European, Asian and 
African countries, mostly after 1990. With regard to this, it is necessary to address 
the practice of some of them. Firstly, this should refer to the formally semi-
presidential president-parliamentary systems of government in Russia, Belarus 
or Azerbaijan etc., which are frequently referred to be the examples of 
authoritarian-oligarchic systems of government with superpresidents99. According 
to Shugart and Carey100, these systems should be called president-like president-
parliamentarism. Their attributes/disadvantages are as follows:  
1. The reliability of presidents’ monocratic and subjective powers on force 
structures and “parties of power” or on immaturity of party systems, 
without which the accumulation of power, which presidents actually 
have in their hands, is impossible; 
2. The symbolism of monocratic subjectivity of powers between 
functional and territorial centres and periphery, based on “elections 
fetishism”;  
3. The non-realisation of the principle of political responsibility of 
central power organisations mainly manifested with a president101.  
Moreover, the disadvantage of positions of superpresidents in semi-
presidential and presidential republican systems with superpresidents leading to 
authoritarisation and personalisation of governments is the way of presidential 
power transfer. Traditionally it is formally realised through elections and 
actually through the elections resulting in power transfer, i.e. through the election 
of successor by the predecessor (this, for example, is the characteristic of 
Azerbaijan, Russia etc.). However, sometimes the same person is the president 
regardless of how often (in a row or with intervals) he/she is elected (for 
example, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan etc.).  
Besides, in semi-presidential republics with superpresidents, presidents’ 
dominating status is dependent on the fact that they are formally put beyond the 
framework of the triad of governmental power distribution, though they actually 
stand over the triad of governmental power, because they also have authorities 
in the legislative and judicial branches of government. This is visible in the fact that 
                                                        
99
  Andrew Arato, “The New Democracies and the American Constitutional Design”, 
Constellations, vol. 7, no. 3, 2000, p. 318; David Mastro, Kyle Christensen, Power and 
Policy Making: The Case of Azerbaijan, Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto, 
2006; Lilia Shevtsova, Kirill Holodkovskiy, Rossiya Politicheskaya, Moskovskiy Centr 
Karnegi, Moskva, 1998, pp. 22-28. 
100
  Matthew S. Shugart, John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and 
Electoral Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 148-158. 
101
  Igor Kliamkin, “Rossiyskaya Vlast’ na Rubezhe Tysyacheletiy”, Pro et Contra, vol. 4, no. 2, 
2001, pp. 63-87. 
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superpresidents of semi-presidential republics, who, from legislative point of view, 
are the “guarantors of the constitutions”, either being or not being formally the 
rulers of executive power (i.e. chief executives), actually chair executive vertical 
of government and disrupt the balance of governmental power distribution. 
Moreover, when it is referred to legal instruments of overconcentration of power in 
hands of presidents, political systems obviously can be legally transformed into 
nondemocratic forms of government. The important fact is that quite frequently 
superpresidents in semi-presidential republics consciously try to change of 
constitutional systems of government for their own benefit. This takes place 
either through more constitutional concentration of powers in implementing 
state powers by presidents, or through the constitutional increase of presidential 
terms, or through nonconstitutional and political increase of presidential powers 
(or by all means simultaneously). Instead, in presidential republics with 
superpresidents, presidents’ dominating status is much formalised at least with 
regard to the fact that presidents constitutionally perform their roles and roles of 
the rulers of executive power (chief executives), i.e. they form their cabinets 
and control their activity themselves, regardless of legislatures. 
With regard to this, it is clearly understandable that there is no 
theoretical and methodological question about republicanism with the position of 
superpresident (or in other words about superpresidentialism in a wide sense) as of 
integral and “pure” system of government. Instead, it should be noted that positions 
of superpresidents might exist in different systems of republican government, i.e. 
presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. Hence, this corresponds to the conclusion 
drawn by Elgie that the type of constitutional republican system of government 
(presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, parliamentarism) do not directly depend 
upon the formal and actual powers of key governmental actors, and is based 
only on the mechanism of powers, authorities distribution and the way of 
formation and termination of governmental institutions and bodies. 
Consequently, it is obvious that presidentialism, semi-presidentialism and 
parliamentarism can be represented by the positions of weak (nominal), 
intermediate, powerful and very powerful presidents (superpresidents)102. 
Therefore, it is appropriate not to identify superpresidentialism as an independent 
republican system of government with the position of superpresident, but to 
reduce it to the specific form of any independent republican system of 
government characterised by the position of superpresident, formally/actually 
dominating over the other branches of government. The matter is that the 
constructions of republican systems of government (or the mechanisms of 
comparison of authorities between the supreme executive and legislative 
branches of government) in different states, characterised by the positions of 
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  Even despite this, presidential republics most often inherent strong or very strong 
presidents. Parliamentary republics most often are realized through weak or intermediate 
presidents. Instead, semi-presidential republics often are realized through weak, 
intermediate or strong presidents.  
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superpresidents, are diverse. Accordingly, superpresidential semi-presidentialism 
and superpresidential presidentialism should be frequently singled out103. Both the 
first and the second types traditionally gravitate towards and lead to autocracy 
(authoritarianism or totalitarianism), limiting or cancelling such principles of 
democracy as political participation and competitiveness104. 
Alongside, presidential and semi-presidential systems of government 
with the positons of superpresidents combine different risks caused by 
superpresidents’ positions. Accordingly, the ways of minimisation of risks of 
power accumulation in the hands of one person that a priori leads to autocracy 
are analogous. Among them, according to Zaznaev105, the following ways are 
singled out the most frequently: 
1. Prohibition of re-election of the same person as a president for two 
times in a row or more than two times in a row; 
2. Introduction of collective presidency institute; 
3. Introduction of the instruments of parliamentary-governmental 
domination (for instance, “cabinet government”);  
4. Introduction of the instruments of quasi-parliamentarism to executive 
power institutions (for instance, impeachment procedures to members 
of cabinet on the side of the Parliament);  
5. Practical implementation of mechanisms of approval (counterassignation) 
of all or key appointments made by a president;  
6. Introduction of the institution of presidential acts’ countersigning on 
the side of the chair of a cabinet or its members, as well as the system 
of joint exercising of executive power by a president and other 
governmental institutions;  
7. Introduction or simplification of the presidential impeachment institution 
on the part of a Parliament or leading chamber of a Parliament; 
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 Timothy J. Colton, Cindy Skach, Semi-Presidentialism in Russia…cit. 
104
 A striking example of the negative impact of republican systems of government with 
superpresidents on the prospects of democratisation is the experience of post-Soviet 
countries, including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 
Ukraine and others. This is even despite significant progress in the first stage of their 
political transit and the fact that the presidents were positioned with media as 
“democratisators”. For example, when Belarus in 1994 moved from the former Soviet quasi-
parliamentarism to presidentialism and in 1996 to semi-presidentialism (actually with the 
position of superpresident), the democratic experiment was finished. Azerbaijan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, which also made the process of “investing 
dominant power to the presidents”, are now positioned as autocratic governments. In contrast, 
moderate presidential or semi-presidential systems that took place in Georgia (1995–2004), 
Moldova (1994-2000) and Lithuania, as well as parliamentary systems (such as Estonia, 
Latvia and Moldova since 2000), where there was the dispersion of government power 
between different political institutions, now are moving toward democratic values (albeit 
in varying degrees). See detailed: Steven M. Fish, “Postcommunist Subversion: Social 
Science and Democratisation in East Europe and Eurasia”, Slavic Review, vol. 58, no. 4, 
1999, pp. 803-804. 
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 Oleg Zaznaev, “Klassifikaciyi Prezidentskoy, Parlamentskoy i Poluprezidentskoy Sistem”, cit.. 
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8. Formation and functioning of independent state-funded governmental 
agencies and departments;  
9. Approval of distinctive systems of government, represented with 
coalitional presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
After estimating the practice of different republican systems of 
government with superpresidents, it is clear that it is much more difficult to 
minimise the risks of power accumulation in hands of one person in formally 
presidential republics. Even despite the introduction of more conspicuous and 
direct mechanisms of checks and balances of presidential powers, particularly in 
the context of executive power distribution between presidents, ministers, 
prime-ministers (which can even be partially/individually responsible to 
parliaments), the initial essence of presidential elections remains in force with 
“zero amount”, at which only one winner survives.  
Instead, it is much easier to prevent the institutionalisation of the 
position of superpresident or to restrict the institutional risks related to 
superpresident’s position in semi-presidential republics. The main problem is 
the fact that in semi-presidential systems of government presidential powers 
significantly (more than in presidential republics) depend upon the party and 
political composition of a Parliament. Besides, in these political systems, the 
institute of executive power dualism is formalised (on the one hand, in the 
person of president, and on the other hand, in the institution of cabinet and the 
person of prime minister). However, even despite this, quite frequently in semi-
presidential systems, presidents turn out to be equal in their powers or actually 
more powerful than in presidential systems. This is often conditioned by the fact 
that semi-presidentialism as republican system of government is changeable 
from a political and institutional point of view. Consequently, semi-
presidentialism can obtain more features of either presidentialism or 
parliamentarism, depending on whether the presidential party (or political party 
associated with the president) is a part of a parliamentary coalition. 
Nevertheless, even despite this, from the formal point of view, superpresidents 
the most frequently are institutions of president-parliamentary and not premier-
presidential types of semi-presidentialism. In the case of president-
parliamentarism with the position of superpresident, constitutional system 
formally can be referred to semi-presidentialism. Instead, such political system 
is frequently referred to be presidential. This presupposes that in case of semi-
presidentialism with the position of superpresident, the institute of executive 
power dualism is actually neglected. Instead, in presidentialism with the 
position of superpresident the executive power is formally monistic. 
 
 
